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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we investigate whether innovative and flexible contractual arrange-
ments can support the process of achieving ambitious sustainability goals. We 
explore this question through an analysis of the role of umbrella agreements in 
driving energy savings in the building sector. Drawing on a case study of the iconic 
Empire State building, we examine the typical challenges faced by clients and con-
tractors in devising suitable agreements that facilitate managing contractual and 
performance risks, as well as the sharing of responsibilities and cooperation between 
multiple project stakeholders. We find that the project arrangements appear to 
exhibit the adoption of the key characteristics commonly found in umbrella agree-
ments which incorporate sustainability measures that maximize income through 
efficient delivery of outcomes. Specifically, this means that they need to enable 
stakeholders to manage repeated review cycles, complex perceptions and expecta-
tions, and different tacit assumptions and codes of behaviour, as well as managing 
and communicating in networks and obtaining agreement also from non-contrac-
tual parties. Moreover, we demonstrate that umbrella agreements can facilitate a 
network perspective of business relationships by emphasizing value co-creation and 
the embeddedness of firms within a network of interactions.  
KEYWORDS
umbrella agreements, contractual arrangements and sustainability goals, energy 
service companies, Empire State Building, managing contractual performance risks, 
energy efficiency and management
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1. INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
There is widespread recognition that the cheapest, most secure and most sustainable form 
of energy is that which is not consumed in the first place. In fact, energy management is 
an increasingly important issue for firms due to volatile energy costs, tightening regulations, 
security of supply issues and environmental concerns (Lucio et al., 2013). Estimates by the 
International Energy Agency suggest that global investment in energy efficiency in 2011 
stood at $300 billion. Implementing all economically viable energy efficiency measures and 
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removing barriers to energy efficiency investments could further avoid the consumption of an 
amount of fuel worth up to $17.5 trillion to 2035 (IEA, 2013b) and inexorably lead to lower 
greenhouse gas emissions as well (Nishant et al., 2014).
With 35% a large proportion of global final energy demand comes from buildings (IEA, 
2013b). Within the U.S. alone it is estimated that the total value of potential energy effi-
ciency retrofit projects represents a $279 billion investment opportunity which could unlock 
energy savings worth more than $1 trillion over ten years (Fulton and Grady, 2012). Yet 
despite the apparent commercial opportunities, greater uptake of energy efficiency improve-
ments often appears to be hampered by a whole range of factors including behavioral reasons 
and market failures (Frankel and Tai, 2013, IEA, 2013a). Particularly the building sector 
faces a unique set of challenges caused by, for example, the split incentives between landlords 
and tenants, the relatively dispersed and small scale nature of each individual investment 
and the lack of knowledge on the part of building owners who tend to outsource building 
management (Beddington, 2008, Egging, 2013, IEA, 2013a, Xu et al., 2011, Xu and Chan, 
2013, Xu et al., 2013).
Increasingly, ‘Energy Service Companies’, or ‘ESCos’, attempt to capitalize on these energy 
efficiency opportunities. ESCos provide energy efficiency products and solutions with the aim 
of achieving significant and predictable technological and operational improvements to the 
running costs of their clients’ premises or facilities. Broadly, ESCos are responsible for the selec-
tion, financing, installation and operation of new or replacement equipment and take ‘payment 
by results’ as a proportion of the energy savings that they achieve (Davies and Chan, 2001).
A key issue with respect to achieving many sustainability goals generally, and energy 
efficiencies in particular, however, is the fact that the necessary resources and know-how 
are often widely dispersed within and among other companies required for achieving these 
targets (Valente, 2012, Montiel and Delgado-Ceballos, 2014). In a world of rapid techno-
logical changes, shifting economic conditions and global competition this can create signifi-
cant uncertainties and unpredictability for managers and investors (Mouzas and Ford, 2006). 
Coupled with the need to engage with a much wider circle of stakeholders the resulting inter-
dependencies can lead to dysfunctional relationships, locked-in solutions and managerial 
complexities, especially when standard business practices and contract agreements are applied 
(Marshall and Brown, 2003, Schleich and Gruber, 2008, DeCanio, 1998). 
In this paper we investigate whether innovative and flexible contractual arrangements 
can support the process of achieving ambitious sustainability goals. We explore this question 
through an analysis of the role of umbrella agreements in driving energy savings in the build-
ing sector. Drawing on an energy efficiency retrofit project case study of the iconic Empire 
State building in New York, we examine the typical challenges faced by clients and contractors 
in devising suitable agreements that facilitate managing contractual and performance risks, as 
well as the sharing of responsibilities and cooperation between multiple project stakeholders. 
In doing so, our research aims to make two key contributions. First, we complement and 
extend existing literature concerning the design and management of innovative contract agree-
ments by applying their specific dimensions to energy efficiency improvements. This allows us 
to determine the extent to which more flexible contractual relationships support the achieve-
ment of sustainability goals. Through our research, we therefore respond to calls for empirical 
work which pays specific attention to the development of commercial agreements, and new 
forms such as umbrella agreements in particular (Mouzas and Blois, 2013, Poppo and Zenger, 
2002, Reuer and Ariño, 2007).
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Second, by exploring the challenges involved in serving a network of direct and indirect 
customers and stakeholders, this research also contributes to our general understanding of 
achieving sustainability goals through interdisciplinary and inter-organisational collaborations 
(Sarkis et al., 2013). We therefore examine to what degree innovative ways of defining, agree-
ing and managing commercial relationships might be a fundamental pre-condition for, and 
integral part of, developing “sustaincentric” commercial propositions (Valente, 2012, Gladwin 
et al., 1995). By focusing on the intersection of the building and energy sectors, we also hope 
to respond to calls for the development of significant additional work addressing sustainability 
in the context of engineering management (Sarkis et al., 2013).
We start our paper by examining prior research into sustainability practices and introduc-
ing the concept of umbrella agreements, before explaining how our research was undertaken 
and providing details of our case study. We close by analyzing and discussing the insights 
gained from this case study and the value of umbrella agreements for achieving sustainability 
goals more generally.
I. SUSTAINABILITY gOALS & PERfORMANCE-BASED CONTRACTINg
Against the backdrop of mounting evidence indicating that efforts towards improving envi-
ronmental conditions remain wholly insufficient (Whiteman et al., 2013, UNEP, 2012), there 
are increasing calls for firms to incorporate sustainability into their business plans and strat-
egies (Schaltegger et al., 2012, Zollo et al., 2013, Rusinko, 2007, Seshadri, 2013). A key 
imperative of such approaches is the organisational capability of developing a greater focus 
on generating income by delivering sustainable outcomes, rather than by purely charging for 
products and services without any consideration for their environmental and social impacts 
(Ford et al., 2003). This argument suggests that integrating sustainability performance targets 
into the product or service delivery effectively removes the linear incentive to provide more 
goods or services in order to increase income. Instead, the aim is to create prosperity by either 
radically reducing negative or creating positive external effects for the natural environment 
and society (Schaltegger et al., 2012, Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008).
Elsewhere, more generic outcome-focused business practices are receiving increasing 
attention and are known as ‘solution business models’ (Storbacka, 2011, 2013), ‘outcome-
based contracts’ (Ng et al., 2013, Ng and Nudurupati, 2010), ‘result-orientated prod-
uct-service systems’ (Barquet et al., 2013), ‘performance-based contracts’ or ‘servitization’ 
(Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988). Examples of such commercial arrangements include Rolls 
Royce’s ‘Power By the Hour ©’ service or printing equipment manufacturers that provide 
their printers to customers for free and then charge per printed sheet (Barquet et al., 2013, Ng 
et al., 2013).
In this paper we argue that these outcome-focused contracting approaches offer the 
potential to support the wider implementation of sustainability goals such as energy efficiency 
improvements and carbon emissions reductions. In traditional relationships that are based 
on payment for providing a product or service, a customer will want to buy the minimum 
required amount, while a provider will want to sell as much as possible. The provider’s incen-
tive of selling as much as possible introduces sales approaches which encourage increased 
consumption of resources and are therefore at odds with sustainability objectives. In outcome-
based business models, by contrast, these clashing incentives are realigned, as both the cus-
tomer and the provider are agreed on achieving a particular outcome, rather than managing 
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the inputs required to achieve this outcome. This has implications for sustainability (Tukker, 
2004). For example, Ng et al. (2013) suggest that outcome-based contracting provides a 
means of supporting corporate sustainability efforts by creating long-term customer value of 
service rather than transactional relationships based on goods.
The challenge in developing these types of sustainable arrangements arises from the fact 
that a new type of business relationship needs to be created where both the provider and the 
customer focus on the delivery of an outcome. Research suggests that the development of 
outcome-focused approaches is dependent on embedding and integrating the performance 
targets within the customer’s operations. This demands increased flexibility as well as a switch 
to a network perspective of the firm’s relationship and interactions with the customer (Stor-
backa et al., 2013). Consequently, customer interaction must be managed very differently due 
to the introduction of new incentives, the transfer of risk from the customer to the provider 
and the shared responsibility for achieving the outcome (Ng et al., 2013, Ng and Nudurupati, 
2010). Such challenges are particularly important in the context of delivering sustainability 
goals which tend to revolve around temporal and spatial trade-offs between social, ecological 
and economic ends (Valente, 2012). 
This link with sustainability performance targets is further strengthened by suggestions 
that sustainability requires firms ‘operating as networks’ rather than as self-centered, purely 
economically-focused organizations (Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008, Sarkis et al., 2013). In fact, 
research around outcome-based contract arrangements emphasizes the value of co-creation 
and the embeddedness of firms within a network of interactions and relationships (Leek and 
Mason, 2009, Mason and Spring, 2011, Mouzas et al., 2008); it is therefore well placed to 
offer insights into the implementation of sustainability goals. In particular, we build on aca-
demic research which argues that ‘umbrella agreements’ can facilitate the management of 
relationships within business networks (Mouzas, 2006). In this paper we explore whether 
umbrella agreements present a potentially promising solution for managing the diverse sets of 
interdependent stakeholders that are invariably involved when firms seek to address sustain-
ability issues (Seshadri, 2013). 
II. UMBRELLA AgREEMENTS
Umbrella agreements are also known as ‘framework agreements’, ‘umbrella contracts’ or ‘frame-
work contracts’ and “describe a joint consent that explicitly articulates a framework of rules and 
principles that guide future agreements.” (Mouzas, 2006). In other words, umbrella agreements 
explicitly anticipate and integrate the need for change and renegotiation during a contractual 
partnership and as such enable the negotiating parties to balance the need for certainty and 
calculability with the desire to remain sufficiently flexible in the face of changing conditions. 
They could also be usefully described as a negotiation platform on which all future contractual 
interactions will be based. Broadly, five key dimensions have been identified as being typical 
for umbrella agreements: ‘manifold reality’, ‘recursive time’, ‘multilateral connectivity’, ‘diver-
sity of norms’, and ‘joint consent’ (Mouzas and Ford, 2006).
Recursive time acknowledges that an ongoing business relationship is typically more valu-
able than any individual transaction (Ford et al., 2003). Furthermore, particularly within 
a long-term business relationship, there is a need to continuously update agreements in 
response to the evolution of the relationship and the network within which it exists (Mouzas 
et al., 2008). This might include, for instance, periodic business and task reviews or annual 
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negotiations (Mouzas and Ford, 2009). Manifold reality describes the need for dealing with 
the divergent perspectives of different actors within a network (Colville and Pye, 2010). When 
developing umbrella agreements, it is important to understand actors’ divergent perspectives 
and to take these into account, as these views of reality often influence the interpretations 
that guide their behaviors (Gadde et al., 2003). Business relationships are also influenced by 
a diversity of norms which determine how different parties act (Feldman, 1984) according to 
the expectations of their social groupings and communities (Nee, 1998). Therefore, agree-
ments must be able to deal with this variety of norms which often remain hidden from formal 
negotiations. The dimension of multilateral connectivity acknowledges that within any given 
business relationship there will be multiple points of contact between different parties. Man-
aging business relationships over an extended period of time requires ‘give and take’ between 
the parties that are directly engaged as well as an ability to deal with third parties not formally 
included in the negotiations (Mouzas and Ford, 2009). Umbrella agreements therefore explic-
itly expect network type relationships, as opposed to the dyadic focus of traditional contracts 
(Barnes et al., 2007). Finally, due to the multiple connection points and exchanges discussed 
above, consent is neither linear, nor dyadic. The types of arrangement managed by umbrella 
agreements require consent from a number of parties which are interdependent and which 
must all take account of each other’s interests and other options (Bazerman and Malhotra, 
2006). In fact, consent for decision making may be evolving over time among the different 
stakeholders (Mouzas and Blois, 2013).
For our analysis, we draw on a case study which explores the role of umbrella agreement 
characteristics during an energy efficiency refit of the Empire State Building. Our aim is to 
investigate to what extent the main contractor is purposefully drawing on innovative commer-
cial arrangements designed to deliver specific sustainability performance goals.
III. RESEARCh METhODOLOgY
Our research methods are guided by an ambition to develop a rich description of the appli-
cation of an umbrella agreement in the case of a company seeking to integrate sustainability 
goals. We employ the case study research method as it offers the opportunity to investigate 
contemporary phenomena where the borders between the phenomena and context are blurred 
(Ford et al., 2003, Wenyu et al., 2013). It allows us developing rich, empirically grounded 
observations which we then confront with theoretical ideas and upon which we can base our 
explanations (Gibbert et al., 2008, Sitoh et al., 2014).
A. Data collection
The case study described in this paper is informed by an extended period of participant obser-
vation from 2008 to 2010, during which the second author worked with a FTSE100 building 
services company as a strategic consultant to define an ‘End to End Energy Service’. The par-
ticipant observation role was informed by the researcher’s background as a mechanical engi-
neer which enabled a better understanding of the technical aspects of energy services. The 
strategy role involved consultations with managers from all departments that were engaged 
with the development of the energy services as well as advisory meetings with the firm’s main 
clients. It also included consultation with energy and climate regulators, further discussions 
with third party providers of energy reporting software as well as competition monitoring 
through industry reports on energy service market trends (BSRIA, 2014).
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This participant observer role provided a comprehensive understanding of the energy 
services market and the dynamics which influence the development of umbrella agreements 
within it (Woodside, 2010). Due to the confidential nature of specific umbrella agreements 
studied, public sources of data have been used for the development of our case study. Yet 
participant observation played an essential part in the research: First, it facilitated the identi-
fication of salient sources of data that are not easily accessed by industry outsiders. Second, it 
provided the background knowledge of the energy services market necessary to interpret the 
secondary sources of data of this case study, all of which are summarized in Table 1.
For our case study we chose the ‘Empire State Building ESCo’ because of the iconic nature 
of the building and its flagship role for energy efficiency projects. The Empire State Building 
is a 103-story skyscraper located in midtown Manhattan, New York City. More importantly, 
the project makes its plans, energy management data and legal paperwork publicly available 
(with some redactions), thus overcoming concerns of confidentiality (ESB, 2013c). We were 
also able to incorporate guidance from government agencies, such as the U.S. Department of 
Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (DOE-EERE, 2007) and from important 
third parties whose input underpinned delivery of the Empire State Building’s ESCo business 
TABLE 1. Public data sources used in developing case study.
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model, for example, the Efficiency Valuation Organization (EVO, 2002) and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2013)
B. Data analysis
Our aim was to explore the role of umbrella agreements in facilitating the implementation of 
sustainable goals. We therefore prioritized explanatory modes of data analysis over statistical 
methods and took a realist stance that encourages explanation via the identification of causal 
explanations (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013, Miller and Tsang, 2011). For the development of 
the case study, we sought to provide a detailed description of the role an umbrella agreement 
played in the ESCo’s service delivery. Consequently, our analysis was undertaken by confront-
ing research data with theoretical concepts (Ragin and Becker, 1992, Yin, 2014). Specifically, 
we used a model from prior research into umbrella agreements to analyze and categorize the 
data from our case study. This conceptual framework enabled us structuring and developing 
an understanding consistent with what could be called an ‘explanatory typology’ (Yin, 2014, 
Elman, 2005). Explanatory typologies are multidimensional conceptual classifications based 
on explicitly stated theory (Elman, 2005). To do so, we identified empirical evidence from the 
ESCo case study and matched this with the five key characteristics of umbrella agreements 
(Mouzas and Blois, 2013).
IV. CASE DESCRIPTION
We begin our analysis by presenting a case study to illustrate the use of an umbrella agreement 
in support of the delivery of integrated sustainability goals. In particular, we investigate how 
an umbrella agreement facilitated the collaboration of a network of organizations involved in 
the operation of an ESCo, which itself was part of a larger energy efficiency refit project of the 
world-famous skyscraper. We start by outlining the general purpose of an ESCo, before detail-
ing how the ESCo involved in our case study was set up and highlighting the targeted energy 
savings outcomes. 
An ESCo is a company which “develops, installs, and funds projects designed to improve 
energy efficiency and reduce operation and maintenance costs in their customers’ facilities. 
ESCOs generally act as project developers for a wide range of tasks and assume the technical 
and performance risk associated with the project. […]When an ESCO undertakes a project, 
the company’s compensation is directly linked to the cost savings from energy actually saved.” 
(DOE-EERE, 2015). As such, the empirical setting of our case study provides an example of 
an industry sector operating with performance-oriented targets, which have the potential to 
significantly reduce global carbon emissions. The ESCo business model therefore stands in 
contrast to traditional energy suppliers that tend to be rewarded for selling more, rather than 
less, energy.
In 2009, the owners of the Empire State Building announced a major sustainability 
program to reduce the building’s carbon footprint, improve energy efficiency and showcase the 
project as a global model for energy efficiency retrofit projects (ESB, 2013c). The Empire State 
Building ESCo, run by Johnson Controls Inc., was contracted to manage a key part of this 
project; all further parties involved in this project are shown in Figure 1 below. As the ESCo, 
Johnson Controls is responsible for the engineering, procurement and construction works that 
deliver the energy savings. The ESCo guarantees these savings under a long-term energy per-
formance contract which it needs to achieve by managing a number of important stakeholders.
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Jones Lang LaSalle acts as the building management service specialists on behalf of the 
building owner. It specializes in wider facilities management services, for example, in activi-
ties such as letting units, managing rental contracts, organizing the cleaning of shared space 
and providing building maintenance. In our case study, their role was to act as the overall 
sustainability program manager for the building on behalf of the building owner. The ESCo 
set up by Johnson Controls had to coordinate with Jones Lang LaSalle to ensure that all pro-
posed energy management projects fitted with the wider energy refit that was underway. The 
second important stakeholder was ‘Empire State Building Operations’, a central operations 
team responsible for day to day management of the building. It acted as Johnson Controls’ 
interface with the building’s tenants and was tasked with ensuring that the ESCo’s activities 
did not disrupt the tenants and their activities.
The remaining stakeholders were external to the Empire State building, but played impor-
tant roles in developing the vision and viability of the wider energy refit of the building and of 
Johnson Controls’ corresponding ESCo activities. First, the New York State Energy Research 
and Development Authority (NYSERDA), a public benefit corporation tasked with support-
ing energy efficiency initiatives in New York, provided technical advice and seed funding to 
help incentivize energy savings on the project. From the publicly reported data, it is not clear 
whether the seed funding directly contributed to Johnson Controls’ ESCo activities, or more 
generally to the wider energy refit. However, in either case, NYSERDA was a key stakeholder 
in terms of helping to plan, and subsequently validate, Johnson Controls’ energy saving pro-
posals. Two other stakeholders were involved in providing independent review and technical 
advice to the project’s energy refit. Although the issue is not specifically discussed in the public 
fIgURE 1: Parties involved in Empire State Building ESCo.*
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documentation, it is likely that they were also seen as playing a role in boosting wider cred-
ibility of the energy saving initiatives through third party endorsement. The Clinton Climate 
Initiative is a project of the Clinton Foundation and provided a wider perspective to inform 
the overall refit program’s sustainability vision. The Rocky Mountain Institute is a niche not-
for-profit organization specializing in energy efficiency which offered independent peer review 
and technical advice to the project. One final important external stakeholder was the ‘Effi-
ciency Valuation Organization’ which conducted energy measurement and verification. The 
parties involved with the Empire State Building ESCo agreed to measure and verify energy 
savings achieved through the ESCo using the ‘International Performance Measurement and 
Verification Protocol’ (IPMVP) and corresponding eQuest software offered by the Efficiency 
Valuation Organization.
Next, we detail the commercial arrangements and specific energy efficiency projects that 
Johnson Controls implemented within its ESCo offering for the Empire State Building. The 
ESCo started in 2007 and over a period of 15 years, Johnson Controls guaranteed 90% of the 
targeted energy savings, valued at $2,240,728. They represent around half of the total energy 
savings sought through the wider energy refit project which in aggregate targets a 38% reduc-
tion in energy usage, translating into a $4.4 million reduction in annual utility costs (JLL, 
2009). Moreover, following all modeling and analysis activities the team decided to pursue 
a program that would ultimately result in saving 105,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide over 
the next 15 years (ESB, 2009). The specific efficiency measures targeted by Johnson Controls 
via the Empire State Buildings’ ESCo are detailed in Table 2.
The ESCo primarily targets engineering-based energy efficiency improvements to the 
heating and ventilation systems in the building and include: retrofitting windows; installing 
reflective insulation; updating steam traps; improving the building automation system; and 
upgrading the chiller plant. These energy efficiency projects involve technical challenges, but 
are relatively ‘self-contained’ in terms of the level of influence of third parties on their opera-
tional success. Accordingly, Johnson Controls could guarantee the projected savings of these 
projects. By contrast, the final measure included within the scope of the project was the facili-
tation of tenant energy management where the ESCo only guaranteed $25,000 of the total 
targeted savings.
TABLE 2. Energy Efficiency Measures within Johnson Controls’ ESCo*.
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V. ANALYSIS
We now take closer look at some of the typical contractual concerns faced by Energy Service 
Companies. Table 3 summarizes our discussion using the risk, responsibility, and perfor-
mance matrix developed by the Department of Energy (DoE) for the development of ESCo 
agreements (DOE-EERE, 2007). Where appropriate, we adjusted and supplemented this 
table with examples from the redacted versions of the Johnson Controls’ ESCo contracts 
(ESB, 2013c).
TABLE 3. Typical contractual concerns for Energy Service Companies (ESCos) and respective 
mitigation efforts in the case study*.
Issue
FINANCIAL
Construction Costs
Energy Related Cost Savings
Interest Rates
Summary
•	Design	and	corresponding	costs	of	energy	efficiency	
investments to be borne by the ESCo must be realistic at 
the outset in order to prevent failure of the ESCo or the 
need for later bailout payments.
•	3rd	party	design	input	and	peer	review	of	plans	can	miti-
gate this risk.
•	Empire State Building ESCo worked with the Clinton 
Climate Initiative, the Rocky Mountain Institute, and the 
New York State Energy Research and Development Author-
ity to manage this risk. 
•	 Improve	energy	management	can	result	in	other	savings,	
e.g. reductions in maintenance budgets, or reduced 
water usage.
•	Parties	to	an	ESCo	arrangement	must	agree	upfront	how	
any non-energy based savings will be measured, verified 
and accounted for.
•	 In the Empire State Building example, fluctuations in oper-
ational costs such as maintenance were the responsibility of 
the ESCo for the duraction of the 15 year agreement. Only 
electricity, gas and steam savings were included in the ESCo 
savings and payment calculations.
•	 Interest	 rates	 fluctuate	 independently	 of	 the	ESCo	
operations.
•	All	parties	should	attempt	to	enable	the	ESCo	agreement	
to be signed at a time when interest rates are favorable and 
therefore offer reduced project financing costs.
•	Publicly available data on the Empire State Building ESCo 
do not disclose whether this consideration was taken into 
account.
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TABLE 3. Continued
Issue
FINANCIAL
Measurement & Verification
OPERATIONAL
Operating Hours & Load
Weather
Summary
•	A	robust	methodology	is	required	in	order	to	measure	
and verify energy savings and manage the payment by 
results elements of an ESCo.
•	 Independent	standards	and	tools	can	help	to	facilitate	
accurate and mutually acceptable measurement and 
verification methods.
• The Empire State Building ESCo calculated energy savings 
using the ‘International Performance Measurement and 
Verification Protocol’ (IPMVP), option D which provides a 
third party software tool called ‘eQuest’ to simulate building 
energy performance. 
•	Over	the	duration	of	an	ESCo	agreement,	changes	in	the	
operating hours of a building, changes to the loading of 
existing equipment, or changes to equipment held within 
the building with all influence energy consumption.
•	Energy	savings	data	should	be	‘normalized’	to	remove	
the influence of operating hours and loading. E.g. 
shorter operating hours shouldn’t count as savings or, 
longer ones as waste.
•	To take account of operating hours, the Empire State Build-
ing ESCo inputs the building’s operating schedule and 
vacancy rates during calibration of the eQuest energy mod-
elling software. Power loading data is also included in the 
eQuest energy model, for example data on: tenant energy 
use; consumption by lighting, eleators, office equipment; and 
energy use by radio broadcasting equipment on the roof.
•	Weather	conditions	will	make	a	significant	difference	to	
energy use in the building, for example via fluctuations 
in heating or air conditioning demand.
•	Energy	measurement	and	verification	tools	must	take	
account of this and normalize energy performance data 
accordingly.
•	 eQuest building energy management software takes New 
York weather data from National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA).
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TABLE 3. Continued
Issue
OPERATIONAL
User Participation
PERFORMANCE
Equipment Performance
Continual Review and
Improvement
Summary
•	Many	energy	saving	measures	require	user	participation	
for successful implementation.
•	ESCo	agreement	should	define	what	level	of	user	partici-
pation is necessary and attribute responsibility for this 
upfront.
•	The Empire State Building ESCo guaranteed technical 
savings that required little third party interface. However, 
due to the difficulty of influencing, measuring and verifying 
the behavior of tenants the ESCo only guaranteed $25,000 
of the targeted $386,709 savings sought from influencing 
tenant energy usage.
•	Equipment	selection,	design,	installation,	maintenance,	
repair and replacement all impact upon energy perfor-
mance and are typically the responsibility of the ESCo.
•	 It	 is	 important	 to	 clarify	 the	 timeframes	 and	 level	
of responsibility of the ESCo with regard to equip-
ment performance agreeing how any shortfalls will be 
compensated.
•	The Empire State ESCo contract is set to span 15 years. All 
aspects of equipment performance are the responsibility of 
the ESCo. In the case of any shortfall in energy savings, the 
ESCo is legally bound to pay the difference between actual 
performance and the guaranteed savings.
•	ESCos	typically	operate	over	an	extended	period	and	
during this time new opportunities to save energy, or to 
optimize existing arrangements, will arise.
•	ESCo	agreements	should	include	clauses	that	allow	for	
new potential improvements to be appraised and which 
specify how decisions to invest, or otherwise, will be 
taken.
•	Empire State ESCo includes a contractual clause to allow 
for continuous review of new opportunities to save energy 
within the scope of ESCo service.
* Table structure based upon the risk, responsibility, and performance matrix developed by the Department of 
Energy for the development of ESCo agreements (DOE-EERE, 2007), examples from Johnson Controls’ Empire 
State Building ESCo contracts in italics which are available at the Empire State Building’s website (ESB, 2013c).
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A. Financial considerations
The first group of issues which influence contractual agreements surrounding an ESCo relate 
to financial considerations. It is important that the design and corresponding construction 
costs of energy efficiency investments to be borne by the ESCo must be realistic at the outset, 
in order to avoid future failure of the ESCo or the need to support it with unplanned pay-
ments. Such a scenario is extremely undesirable since the operations of an ESCo become so 
entwined with those of their customer which means that letting the ESCo fail is typically 
not an option; doing so would cause the interruption of essential utilities of the building 
services, such as lighting or heating. The DoE recommends engaging third party organiza-
tions to review the ESCo’s investment plans upfront. In our case, the Empire State Building 
ESCo worked with the Clinton Climate Initiative, The Rocky Mountain Institute and the 
NYSERDA to manage this risk. By providing technical and project advice these organizations 
effectively supported the ESCo with independent evaluations on the design features and the 
proposed measures. Such objective inputs are invaluable for raising early warning on potential 
risk factors, particularly with regard to budgeting, forecasting and financing.
The next consideration is that improved energy management can result in supplemen-
tary savings, such as reductions in maintenance budgets and reduced water usage. The ESCo 
agreement must therefore define how such additional savings will be measured, verified and 
accounted for. In this case, fluctuation in operational costs, such as maintenance and the use 
of boiler water, were the responsibility of the ESCo for the duration of the 15 year contrac-
tual agreement. Although publicly available data do not confirm this, it is likely that any such 
anticipated ancillary savings were built into the original ESCo cost model. Only electricity, 
gas and steam savings were explicitly included in the ongoing savings and payment calcula-
tions of the ESCo offering.  
Another financial consideration is the influence of interest rates on the ESCo operations. 
Because interest rates may fluctuate, the timing of the agreement to form an ESCo will influ-
ence the final costs of funding energy efficiency measures. The DoE recommends all parties 
work together to target signing the ESCo agreement at a time when interest rates are favor-
able. Unfortunately, in this case there is no publicly available data to confirm whether this 
consideration was taken into account by the ESCo.  
Finally, the financial viability of the ESCo model is based on the requirement for a 
robust methodology which enables the measurement and verification of energy savings so as 
to manage the ‘payment by results’ elements of the contract. Independent standards and tools 
can help to facilitate accurate and mutually acceptable measurement and verification methods 
(Goldman et al., 2005, Sorrell, 2007). The Empire State Building and Johnson Controls cal-
culated energy savings based on the ‘International Performance Measurement and Verification 
Protocol’ (IPMVP), Option D, which uses a software tool called ‘eQuest’ to simulate building 
energy performance (EVO, 2002).
B. Operational considerations
The second set of key contractual issues for ESCos concern the management of operational 
fluctuations which influence the energy performance of the asset in a manner which is inde-
pendent of the efficiency measures implemented by the ESCo. For example, over the duration 
of an ESCo agreement, changes in the operating hours of a building could influence energy 
consumption. Likewise, the loading of existing equipment or changes to equipment held 
within the building will also impact on energy consumption. As a result, energy savings data 
should be ‘normalized’ to remove the influence of operating hours and equipment loading. 
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For example, shorter operating hours should not count as savings and an increase in the 
amount of equipment in the building should not indicate failure of the ESCo to save energy. 
To take account of operating hours, the ESCo included the building’s operating schedule and 
vacancy rates as part of its calibration of the eQuest energy modelling software. Furthermore, 
data on power loads included input into the eQuest energy model on tenant energy use; sub 
meter data from equipment such as lighting systems, elevators and office equipment; and data 
on energy consumption by radio broadcasting equipment installed on the roof.
Similarly, weather conditions can make a significant difference to energy use in a build-
ing, for example, via fluctuations in heating or air conditioning demand. The energy saving 
measurement and verification tools must account for this and normalize energy performance 
data accordingly. In this case, the eQuest software normalizes for the impact of the weather, 
using data on New York City weather conditions that are collated by the NOAA (2013).
Finally, in terms of operational considerations, many energy saving measures require user 
participation for their successful implementation. An ESCo which guarantees energy savings 
will need to define the limits of their responsibility with regard to the level of user participa-
tion required for each planned energy conservation measure and agree responsibility for this 
upfront. In this case, the ESCo guaranteed the majority of savings for the technical projects 
which had little user input, but only guaranteed a small amount of financial savings in rela-
tion to efforts to engage tenants in energy saving changes of behavior. This was due to the dif-
ficulty of separately influencing, measuring and verifying tenants’ behavior which would have 
caused subsequent contractual and financial ambiguities.
C. Performance considerations
The final set of contractual considerations for ESCos relate to how ongoing building perfor-
mance and efficiency savings are maintained. The first important issue is that lasting energy 
efficiency improvements rely on suitable equipment selection, system design, installation, 
maintenance, repairs and replacement. These considerations all impact on energy performance 
and typically remain the responsibility of the ESCo. To support long-term equipment perfor-
mance it was necessary to agree the specific timeframes and levels of responsibility for the 
ESCo and how any shortfalls would be compensated. In this case study, the contract is set to 
span 15 years of operation and all maintenance remains the ESCo’s responsibility. As a result 
the ESCO is required to compensate for any shortfall in performance, as well as being legally 
bound to compensate for the difference between actual energy efficiency performance and the 
savings which the ESCo has guaranteed.
Finally, since ESCos typically operate over an extended period, during their lifetime, new 
opportunities to save energy or to optimize existing arrangements are likely to arise. As such, 
ESCo agreements should allow for potential improvements to be appraised and which specify 
how decisions to invest, or otherwise, will be taken. The Empire State Building ESCo contract 
specifically includes a statement1 to cover changes to the ‘energy conservation measures’ (ESB, 
2013b). This means that, subject to customer consent, there is an opportunity to continually 
review and improve the energy savings implemented by the ESCo.
The details of this particular case study demonstrate how the ESCo faces a variety of chal-
lenging circumstances in the delivery of sustainability-oriented goals and services and therefore 
requires careful consideration of the applicability of standard contractual arrangements such as 
achieving specific energy efficiency improvements. In the next section we analyze the extent to 
which characteristics commonly found in umbrella agreements helped with binding a network 
of project partners into a sufficiently flexible, yet mutually beneficial contractual framework.
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VI. DISCUSSION
Based on the insights offered by our case study we discuss our analysis by using the five key 
characteristics of umbrella agreements introduced earlier and relating them to the Empire 
State Building ESCo’s contractual terms and stakeholder considerations (Table 4).
TABLE 4. Elements of Energy Performance Contract.
1. “The mutual goal of the Parties is to maximize the Project Savings Amount. Therefore, the ESCO shall have the right, at all 
times during the Guarantee Term, subject to the Customer’s written approval, to modify or replace any of the ECMs (energy 
conservation measures) or install additional ECMs and to revise any procedures for the operation of the ECMs or implement 
other procedures at the Site provided that: (i) such actions by the ESCO do not result in modifying the standards of comfort and 
service set forth in Schedule C without the express written approval of the Customer; (ii) such actions do not detrimentally impact 
Site operations or use and occupancy of tenant space; (iii) such actions are necessary to enable the ESCO to achieve or exceed 
the Guaranteed Annual Savings Amount; and (iv) any costs incurred including maintenance related charges, relative to such 
modifications, additions or replacements of the ECMs, or operational changes or new procedures shall be the sole responsibility of 
the ESCO.” ESB. 2013b. Empire State Building: Schedule A: Project Description (redacted version of energy services performance 
contract for the Empire State Building retrofit project) [Online]. New York: Jones Lang LaSelle. Available: http://www.esbnyc.
com/documents/sustainability/Redacted_Schedules_for_Retrofit_project_2.doc [Accessed January 2014.
88 Volume 11, Number 1
A. Recursive time – managing repeated review cycles
In our case study, the need for period review was particularly important. Although the ESCo 
was set up to run for 15 years in order to recoup the initial capital investments made in energy 
efficient equipment, it also involved a number of recurrent sub-cycles to manage performance 
and distribute savings over the duration of the agreement. These recursive cycles involved an 
annual savings review which required annual energy performance measurement and verifica-
tion, followed by settlement of any shortfalls against the guaranteed saving amounts that the 
ESCo had promised as part of their contract. Furthermore, apart from this annual cycle there 
was also an open cycle of continuous review of the energy conservation measures employed 
by the ESCo. This was designed to ensure that new opportunities to further improve savings 
were realized, for example, through continuous improvement and learning, or the integration 
of new technologies. Identification and subsequent approval of these opportunities required 
input from all stakeholders and consent from the building owner on an ongoing basis. For 
these reasons, we argue that including clauses that provide opportunities for repeated contrac-
tual reviews as common in umbrella agreements is an important factor in driving long-term 
review processes and performance improvements necessary for the achievement of many sus-
tainability goals.
B. Manifold reality – managing complex perceptions and expectations
The dimension of dealing with manifold reality proved equally relevant for supporting the 
work of this ESCo as it suggests that stakeholder have diverse interpretations of the same 
focal project. Specifically, we observed that the Empire State Building was perceived in very 
different ways by the different stakeholders involved in the ESCo’s energy efficiency service. 
Namely, to the building owner, the Empire State Building is an investment asset from which 
they seek to maximize income. To the tenants, the building is the site from which they operate 
their businesses. To Johnson Controls, the NYSERDA and the Rocky Mountain Institute, 
the building was primarily a site where they sought to maximize energy savings. Similarly, but 
with a slightly different focus, the Clinton Climate Initiative and Rocky Mountain Institute 
also perceived the site as an opportunity to demonstrate climate change mitigation initiatives 
in existing buildings. Finally, the third party of the Efficiency Valuation Organization treated 
the Empire State Building as a customer for its energy measurement and verifications tool 
‘eQuest’. Taken together, these multiple views held by the numerous stakeholders involved in 
the project created a set of complex expectations which the ESCo had to manage in order to 
successfully deliver the energy savings it had contractually guaranteed.
C. Diversity of norms – managing tacit assumptions and codes of behaviour
In line with these diverse interpretations of what the ESCo was due to deliver, an examination 
of the different stakeholders affecting and affected by the energy savings at the Empire State 
Building suggests that the ESCo operated by Johnson Controls also had to manage a diverse 
set of norms. The most salient norm for the building’s owners, tenants and their representa-
tive, ‘Empire State Building Operations’, was that of minimizing any disruption caused to 
tenants by the energy efficiency measures. Johnson Controls, on the other hand, as the ESCo 
provider was driven by the norm of maximizing energy savings. This norm was shared by the 
NYSERDA and the Rocky Mountain Institute. However, it is clear that the interface between 
these two norms required careful management, since the tenants were the primary source of 
income for the building owner. This norm therefore set hard and fast boundaries as to what 
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types of measures would be acceptable means by which the ESCo could seek to reduce energy 
consumption: those which caused too much disruption to tenants would not be acceptable. 
Finally, the Clinton Climate Initiative worked to a slightly different norm, which was mainly 
driven by their goal of bringing about widespread action on climate change mitigation. As 
such, their norm was to maximize the CO2 emission reductions and to showcase the wider 
sustainability impact of the retrofit project. Again, this norm has to be followed within limits 
caused by its confrontation with the other norms. The ESCo had guaranteed a certain level of 
energy savings and was working ‘at risk’. It therefore worked towards a norm of minimizing 
the capital and operational costs of energy saving measures so as to maximize profitability. This 
meant that it was unwilling to explore some of the more expensive climate change mitigation 
options proposed by the Clinton Climate Initiative. Consequently, the ESCo agreement had 
to take into account and provide resolution mechanisms for a variety of norms in order to 
foster the long-term relationships necessary to pay back the initial capital investment and to 
incorporate the flexibility required to uphold and continuously improve energy performance.
D. Multilateral connectivity – managing and communicating in networks
The discussions above illustrate the importance of acknowledging the significant multilateral 
connectivity that was inherent in the delivery of the Empire State Building ESCo. Instead of 
viewing an ESCo as a contract between a provider and the building owner, our case study 
demonstrates that the delivery of an energy efficiency project also required engagement with a 
wider network that included tenants, the site operations team, external advisors and external 
measurement and verification experts. As a result, the contractual arrangements had to make 
allowances for reporting and communicating through a variety of channels, for the use of 
clear terminology and terms of references as well as the possibility of settling any disputes in a 
mutually acceptable manner.
E. Joint consent – obtaining agreement also from non-contractual parties
Finally, the ESCo had to acknowledge that this multilateral connectivity leads to the need 
to cultivate relationships with multiple stakeholders involved in the delivery of the project, 
in which case fostering consent in most cases can only be encouraged, rather than legally 
enforced. For example, changes to heating thermostat settings or lighting levels that might 
save even more energy required joint consent from several stakeholders. Although an ESCo 
may only have one primary fee-paying client, the success of the contractual arrangement 
depends on developing joint consent with a much wider group of stakeholders.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have explored the role of innovative contractual arrangements during the 
implementation of sustainability goals. We provided a case study which examined the rel-
evance of an umbrella agreement employed by an ‘Energy Service Company’ in the delivery of 
a major energy efficiency refit at the Empire State Building in New York. 
Theoretically, our paper is among the first to link the concept of umbrella agreements to 
the implementation of sustainability goals. These links have been built via two related streams 
of management research. First, we have argued that ‘outcome-based’ contracting offers oppor-
tunities to incorporate sustainability measures that maximize income through efficient delivery 
of outcomes, as they provide an alternative to traditional ‘input-orientated’ business models 
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which incentivize increased consumption (Ng et al., 2013, Ng and Nudurupati, 2010). 
Second, the network perspective of business relationships emphasizes value co-creation and 
the embeddedness of firms within a network of interactions (Mason and Spring, 2011, Ford 
et al., 2008). We suggest that this perspective is particularly relevant during the management 
of outcome-based sustainable performance goals and that drawing on umbrella agreements 
may be a promising approach for managing these particular types of relationships. For these 
reasons, we suggest that umbrella agreements offer new ways of defining, agreeing and manag-
ing the commercial relationships that typify ‘sustaincentric’ commercial propositions (Valente, 
2012, Gladwin et al., 1995). The integration of sustainability goals requires innovative forms 
of multi-lateral arrangements that can coordinate and integrate a variety of demands beyond 
deterministic, dyadic and contractual relationships, and which move towards more network-
oriented and trust-based relationships instead (Barnes et al., 2007, Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008, 
Colville and Pye, 2010, Holmes and Smart, 2009, Xu et al., 2011).  
In our analysis, we discussed how aspects of umbrella agreements provide insights into 
ways of balancing the need for certainty and calculability with the desire to remain suffi-
ciently flexible. As became apparent from our case study, this was an absolute necessity for the 
delivery of energy efficiency improvements in the multi-stakeholder, long-term service con-
tracts exemplified by the ESCo offerings. We found that arrangements managed by the ESCo 
appear to exhibit adoption of characteristics commonly found in umbrella agreements and 
that the arrangements broadly covered the following five key dimensions (Mouzas and Ford, 
2006) along which the ESCo had to operate: 
•	 Recursive	time	–	managing	repeated	review	cycles
•	 Manifold	reality	–	managing	complex	perceptions	and	expectations
•	 Diversity	of	norms	–	managing	different	tacit	assumptions	and	codes	of	behaviour
•	 Multilateral	connectivity	–	managing	and	communicating	in	networks
•	 Joint	consent	–	obtaining	agreement	also	from	non-contractual	parties
Through the use of umbrella agreements, the Empire State Building ESCo project has 
already exceeded guaranteed energy savings for the second year in a row, and has saved $2.3 
million (ESB, 2013a). These energy savings are unlikely to have ever been achieved by tenants, 
landlords, or the building owner on their own and each one of the dimensions would appear 
to provide a vital contribution to the project’s success.
Although the potential for umbrella agreements to support sustainability goals has 
received little attention in the management literature to date, we believe that the links demon-
strated by our case study suggest that their potential interaction represents an exciting line of 
enquiry, which deserves further investigation. For instance, how can we rationalize the com-
paratively slow uptake of sustainability initiatives? Is it due to their highly complex nature 
which may lead to transaction costs that are either too high or too risky to predict (Sorrell, 
2007)? We suggest that umbrella agreements may help to reduce and manage these transaction 
costs and therefore to increase the feasibility of previously difficult or unviable sustainability 
goals (Qian and Guo, 2014, Qian et al., 2012, Qian et al., 2015). Other potentially exciting 
areas of empirical research could include advanced waste reduction and recycling schemes; 
efficient supply chain, distribution and reverse logistics; and industry-wide efforts such as sus-
tainable fishing, logging, or water sourcing.
Following on from our paper, we would argue that more empirical research is also 
needed to study to what extent umbrella agreements can be more widely employed in the 
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development of sustainable business models more generally. The substitution of products for 
results-oriented services certainly appears to provide ample opportunities for reappraising cus-
tomer value and thus avoid the need for selling ownership of goods. But for many types of 
products and goods, outcome-based arrangements may not be suitable. How would umbrella 
agreements apply in these circumstances? And where they do, how might outcome-oriented 
business models and innovative contractual arrangements drive the general development of a 
more ‘circular economy’ (Andersen, 2007)?
Finally, we also wonder whether the five characteristics of umbrella agreements explored 
in our case study are either exhaustive or relevant enough to be applied in other sustainabil-
ity goals or business models. What type of modifications would organizations need to make 
in their cases? What are the specific conditions that determine the success or failure of such 
outcome-based approaches? At the same time, how can more companies exploit the potential 
benefits of employing umbrella agreements? What, if anything, is stopping them from doing 
so? We hope our paper serves as an insightful starting point and rallying call for greater (schol-
arly) engagement with outcome-based umbrella agreements in the context of integrating sus-
tainability goals and business models.
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